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I. INTRODUCTION
Two important federal policies are headed for a collision at
the crossroads of environmental law and bankruptcy law. The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)' evidences congressional in-
tent that the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste should be
assessed against those responsible for creating that waste.
When the party responsible for creating hazardous waste files a
petition in bankruptcy, however, the goals of CERCLA are in
direct conflict with the policy of providing a debtor with a
"fresh start" under the Bankruptcy Code.2 This article pro-
poses that the conflict be resolved by amending the Bank-
ruptcy Code to grant a priority in the distribution of a debtor's
assets to environmental cleanup claims.
Part I of this article describes the current conflict between
environmental cleanup and bankruptcy legislation. Part II dis-
cusses the Bankruptcy Code priority scheme, paying close at-
1. CERCLA §§ 101-75, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988). The Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, or CERCLA, imposes liabil-
ity against those who release hazardous substances into the environment for the full
cleanup costs.
2. See Title I of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-589, 92 Stat.
2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330 (1988)).
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tention to the treatment of priority claims of governmental
units. Part III analyzes CERCLA liability and suggests that the
Bankruptcy Code drafters neither anticipated nor accounted
for liability of this new and unique type. Part IV examines the
wide range of possible priority levels for cleanup claims under
the current bankruptcy law. Part V argues that a fixed and pre-
dictable level of priority for cleanup claims would better serve
the interests of both environmental enforcers and creditors.
Finally, Part VI proposes specific amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Code which would establish a new priority for cleanup
claims and take a critical step toward harmonizing the compet-
ing federal interests behind CERCLA and the Bankruptcy
Code.
II. THE CROSSROADS
With the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),3
Congress ushered in a powerful array of measures to remedy
the growing problem of hazardous waste contamination.4
CERCLA provides for the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste
sites with money from the federal "Superfund. ' ' 5 After
cleanup, liability for cleanup expenditures is imposed jointly
and severally upon any or all potentially responsible parties
(PRPs).6
Cost recovery from PRPs is CERCLA's critical feature. Cost
recovery instills in the business community a high level of envi-
ronmental consciousness. But most importantly, it evidences
3. CERCLA §§ 101-57, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57.
4. Many states have enacted "mini-Superfund" statutes, analogous to CERCLA.
However, this article discusses CERCLA as a paradigmatic example of environmental
cleanup legislation. It does not address the particular differences among the various
state analogues or the problems of interagency jurisdiction. The general term
"cleanup claims" refers to cost recovery claims that may arise under either CERCLA
or state superfund statutes.
5. See infra part II-B. See also 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988). The Hazardous Sub-
stance Response Trust Fund was originally promulgated as a part of CERCLA. See
CERCLA § 221, 42 U.S.C. § 9631, repealed by, Superfund Revenue Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-499, § 517(e), 100 Stat. 1772, 1773-74, amended by, Pub. L. No. 10 1-508,
Title XI, § 11231(d), 104 Stat. 1388-45. In 1986, however, the maintenance of the
Superfund was turned over to the Internal Revenue Service. Id. The current
Superfund is funded by environmental taxes, monies recovered from CERCLA viola-
tors, monies recovered from violators of the Clean Water Act, and by money appro-
priated by the United States Treasury. 26 U.S.C. § 9507.
6. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
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Congress' explicit policy choice not to "socialize" the costs of
environmental cleanup in any way.7 Ultimately, the full costs
are to be borne by the private polluters.8 Congress apportions
none of the federal fisc to environmental cleanup except for
that which is used to maintain the Superfund and to facilitate
early responses to environmental hazards.9 Although CER-
CLA does create the possibility that a disproportionately large
share of liability might be imposed on a PRP who is only re-
motely related to an environmental hazard,' 0 this contingency
is part and parcel of the .will of the enacting Congress.
Yet cost recovery from PRPs, so critical to CERCLA, is jeop-
ardized in cases where PRPs avail themselves of another of
Congress' powerful federal remedies: relief from debt and a
"fresh start" under the Bankruptcy Code." The Bankruptcy
Code strives to give claimholders with equal legal rights equal
shares in the distribution of the debtor's estate. 2 Only where
there is a special need for a full recovery have certain types of
claims been granted a statutory priority in distribution.' 3 One
such priority is for certain "allowed unsecured claims of gov-
ernmental units.""' As drafted, however, this priority covers
only specifically enumerated claims for taxes and customs du-
7. See, e.g., Murray Drabkin et al., Bankruptcy and the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste:
Caveat Creditor, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 10168 (1984).
8. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). This section provides that:
[o]wners and operators of vessels or facilities, now or at the time of disposal
of hazardous waste, and any persons who completed or arranged for dispo-
sal, treatment or transport of hazardous waste shall be liable for all costs
incurred by the government or others for removal or remedial action or
other costs and for damages caused to or destruction of any natural re-
sources and for any and all health assessment or health effects studies
completed.
Id.
9. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507(a). The Treasury of the United States is authorized to
appropriate in excess of $250,000,000 for environmental cleanup during each year
from 1987 until 1995. See Superfund Revenue Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
§ 517(b), 100 Stat. 1772, amended by, Pub. L. No. 101-508, Title XI, § 11231(d), 104
Stat. 1388-1445 (1990).
10. See Drabkin, supra note 7, at 10170. Innocent PRPs may be held solely liable
when a culpable PRP is found judgment proof because courts have uniformly deter-
mined that all PRPs are jointly and severally liable.
11. See Title I of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-589, 92 Stat.
2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330 (1988)).
12. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (1988) ("Payment on claims of a kind ... shall be
made pro rata among claims of the kind.").
13. 11 U.S.C. § 507. See also infra part II-A. for discussion of statutory priority in
distribution.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7).
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ties; it does not mention compensatory government claims, 15
environmental or otherwise. Thus, cleanup claims appear to
receive regular treatment under the Bankruptcy Code: the
claim is impaired, the government receives a share in the
debtor's distribution, and the claim is discharged.
However, certain aspects of cleanup claims suggest that they
are in special need of a full recovery and should be granted
priority. Impairment of a cleanup claim affects more than the
economic fate of the claimant; it also compromises the entire
national cleanup effort by diminishing the Superfund. Regular
debt treatment for cleanup claims does not show adequate
comity for the specific policies behind the environmental laws,
especially CERCLA. Furthermore, cleanup claims seem at
least as deserving of special treatment as the prioritized tax
claims.' 6 Like tax claims, cleanup claims are obligations aris-
ing from a statute. Thus, they are closely akin to other affirma-
tive, non-monetary statutory obligations which are not
avoidable by a debtor's resort to the bankruptcy process.7
On the other hand, cleanup claims tend to be very large and
lay a greater claim on the bankruptcy estate than do tax claims
or the other priority claims. If cleanup claims are accorded
special treatment in bankruptcy, other creditors will face new,
incalculable risks when they lend to industries connected with
hazardous waste. 8 In the face of these competing concerns, it
is not surprising that the bankruptcy treatment of cleanup
claims has been the subject of considerable judicial
controversy.' 9
The United States Supreme Court has warned that environ-
mental obligations cannot merely be cast aside in bank-
ruptcy. 20 Some lower courts have found in the spirit of these
15. Compensatory claims are those in which the government seeks reimburse-
ment from private parties for direct government outlays. See II U.S.C. § 507.
16. See II U.S.C. § 507(a)(7). The prioritized tax claims include: 1) income taxes
for taxable year ending on or before petition date, 2) taxes assessed within 240 days
during which an offer of compromise has been made within 240 days after assess-
ment, 3) taxes other than for which a return was not filed, 4) property taxes assessed
before commencement of the case, 5) taxes required to be collected or withheld and
for which debtor is liable, 6) employment taxes, and 7) certain excise taxes. Id.
17. See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
18. Drabkin, supra note 7, at 10180.
19. See infra part V, which discusses various judicial approaches to the treatment
of claims.
20. This warning has been given in two cases concerning affirmative cleanup or-
ders, not monetary cleanup claims. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of
1992]
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cases a license to elevate cleanup claims to priority status as
administrative expenses of the estate. 21 However, other courts
have taken a more formalistic approach and found that cleanup
claims do not literally meet the Code's definition of adminis-
trative expenses. 2 In these cases, cleanup claims have been
relegated to general unsecured status.
2 3
Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code, under certain circum-
stances, does not seem to preclude the possibility of even more
extreme resolutions to this problem, ranging from entirely
barring cleanup claimants from participating in a bankruptcy
distribution 4 to granting them an unassailable place first in
line.2 5 If these plausible theories gain judicial approval, the
spectrum of possible bankruptcy treatments for cleanup claims
will become wider and more complicated.
In practice, the confusion over the proper priority for
cleanup claims in bankruptcy puts unnecessary burdens and
risks on debtors, creditors, and environmental agencies alike.
All parties need a predictable and consistent rule which will
give proper deference to the environmental policy goals at
stake. Such a rule, however, is unlikely to arise from further
judicial manipulation of the existing priority rules. The Bank-
ruptcy Code, as is, simply does not accommodate the unique
and unforeseen problems of cleanup claims.
This commentator feels that the Bankruptcy Code should be
amended to grant priority to environmental cleanup claims.
There are three reasons for this proposal. The first reason is
historical. The absence of such a priority from the Bankruptcy
Code should not be interpreted as a determination by the
drafters that cleanup claims are undeserving of priority.
Rather, the omission seems to have arisen from the simple fail-
ure of the drafters to foresee the arrival of claims of this
unique type. Only since the adoption of CERCLA in 1980
have environmental obligations come in the form of monetary,
Envtl. Protection (In re Quanta Resources), 474 U.S. 494, 502 (1986) ("[T]he trustee
is not to have carte blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law."); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S.
274, 285 (1985) ("[Wle do not question that anyone in possession of the site ...
must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio.").
21. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
24. See infra part IV-C for discussion on the problem of categorizing cleanup
claims under the Bankruptcy Code,
25. See infra part IV-A.
[Vol. 18
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss1/3
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AND BANKRUPTCY
compensatory debts.2 6 When the bounds of the priority for
governmental unit claims were drawn, nothing comparable to
today's CERCLA cleanup claim was in existence.
The second reason is grounded in comity. Congress has un-
equivocally decided to place the costs of environmental
cleanup on private enterprise.27 Yet the Bankruptcy Code
threatens to recast a share of these costs upon the government
in some cases. 28 To solve this conflict of federal policies, the
more general principles of debt relief must bend to accommo-
date the more specific objectives of hazardous waste policy.
The third reason is grounded in pragmatism. Concerns
about grave repercussions in the lending community that
would result from the government's priority recovery cannot
continue to hold sway. Large environmental liabilities have
become a fact of life in the many industries connected with
hazardous waste. It is no longer reasonable or fair to assume
that lenders and credit markets cannot or should not account
for the risks associated with the possible environmental obliga-
tions of borrowers.
III. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE PRIORITIES
The Bankruptcy Code priority rules contemplate a distribu-
tion of the debtor's assets in a Chapter 7 liquidation. How-
ever, the rules also come into play where the debtor is to be
reorganized, since, in Chapter 11, a proposed plan of reorgani-
zation can be defeated by any single claimant who shows that
he or she would have received more in a liquidation
26. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). A violator is liable for all costs of
removal or remedial action incurred by the United States, a state or Indian tribe not
inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan, any other necessary costs of re-
sponse incurred by any other person consistent with the National Contingency Plan;
damages for injury to or loss of natural resources; and costs of health assessment or
health effects study carried out under section 9604(i). Id.
27. See CERCLA § 107(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c). This section provides a cap to
monetary liability for each release of hazardous material unless: the release was the
result of willful misconduct or negligence; the primary cause of the release was a
violation of applicable safety, construction, or operation standards; or the party fails
to provide reasonable cooperation and assistance requested by a public official. Id.
This section also authorizes the United States to recover punitive damages from re-
sponsible persons who fail to properly provide remedial action in response to an
order issued under section 9604 or 9606. Id.
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A. General Order of Distribution
First, the Bankruptcy Code honors the valid and perfected
liens30 of secured creditors. Secured creditors may recover
from the proceeds of the sale of their collateral and assert un-
secured claims for any collateral deficiency.3 ' Such recovery
can be diminished only for the "reasonable, necessary costs
and expenses of preserving, or disposing of such property to
the extent of any benefit to" secured creditors.32
Next, three main types of unsecured claims are granted pri-
ority. First, most claims which arise post-petition are deemed
administrative expenses of the estate and are payable while the
case is pending.3 3 These include the actual, necessary costs
and expenses of preserving the estate, compensation for pro-
fessionals, and some post-petition taxes.34 Second, various
pre-petition claims of individuals such as claims for employees'
wages and benefit plans, and claims for jilted consumer credi-
tors are also elevated. 35 Third, certain claims of governmental
units receive priority.36 A reorganization plan must provide
that all priority claims be paid in full upon distribution.
The rest of the unsecured claimants recover equal propor-
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7). This section is commonly known as the "best inter-
ests test."
30. The Bankruptcy Code broadly defines lien as: "charge against or interest in
property to secure payment of debt or performance of an obligation." 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(33).
31. A claim is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest
in its collateral, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
The allowed claim is "an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such credi-
tor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such al-
lowed claim." 1 U.S.C. § 506(a). The Code further provides that "the trustee, after
notice and a hearing, shall dispose of property in which an entity other than the
estate has an interest, such as a lien, and that has not been disposed of under another
section of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 725.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c).
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (listing allowed administrative expenses, other than
those allowed under section 502(f)); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (providing that adminis-
trative expenses allowed under section 503(b) have the highest priority of the ex-
penses and claims listed).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A).
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(3)-(6).
36. See infra part II-B for a discussion of the special case of governmental unit
claims.
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tions of their claims, except that late claims and penalties
claims are subordinated.3" Subordination of a claim also can
be obtained by preexisting agreement or for equitable
misconduct.39
B. The Special Case of Governmental Unit Claims
Bankruptcy Code § 507(a)(7) grants certain unsecured
claims of governmental units priority ahead of general un-
secured claims but behind the other priority claims.40 This pri-
ority is given to income taxes, unsecured property taxes,
employment-related taxes, excise taxes, and customs duties
which came due post-petition or in specified pre-petition
periods.4'
Some governmental claims, however, especially tax claims,
are often secured claims created by statutory lien provisions.
For these, the Code has devised a compromise method to pre-
serve the secured character of the claim while allowing the
higher-priority unsecured claims to recover ahead of the gov-
ernment.42 In a Chapter 7 case, therefore, the unavoidable
liens of the taxing authorities become a unique type of secured
claim. 43 The liens may be satisfied out of proceeds from the
sale of collateral, but the proceeds must first be applied to any
extant, non-tax, unsecured priority claims.44 In effect, the
38. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (providing procedures for distribution of property of the
estate).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 510.
The Code states:
(a) A subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under the title to
the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law.
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and
a hearing, the court may -
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for pur-
poses of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of
another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or
part of another allowed interest; or
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be trans-
ferred to the estate.
Id.
40. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7); see also supra note 16.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7); see also supra note 16.
42. See II U.S.C. § 724(b).
43. Unavoidable liens include perfected tax liens which do not secure penalty
claims, 11 U.S.C. § 724(a), and perfected tax liens which arose for reasons other than
the debtor's insolvency or bankruptcy. I I U.S.C. § 545.
44. II U.S.C. § 724(b).
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Code neutralizes the reach of government lien legislation to
preserve a policy that the other priority claimants, who usually
are individuals and post-petition trade creditors, are in greater
need of a full recovery than the government.4"
A reorganization plan must provide that priority govern-
ment claims be paid in full in installments over a six-year pe-
riod from the date of assessment. 46 Taxes or duties arising
outside the pre-petition window can become general un-
secured claims provided that the government authorities' stat-
ute of limitations has not lapsed.47 Any governmental unit
claims of a type not covered by the priority are deemed admin-
istrative expenses if they arise post-petition 48 or general un-
secured claims if they arise pre-petition.49
IV. CERCLA CLEANUP CLAIMS: UNFORESEEN AND UNIQUE
OBLIGATIONS
A. Bankruptcy Treatment of Environmental Obligations as
Contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code Drafters
It is fair to say that, in 1978, when the Bankruptcy Code
drafters created the present system of debt relief, they did not
contemplate its application to environmental cleanup debts.
In fact, before the passage of CERCLA and the creation of the
Superfund in 1980, environmental obligations rarely, if ever,
came in the form of monetary claims for compensation. Even
today, most environmental statutes other than CERCLA are
regulatory in nature.5 0 These statutes typically establish af-
firmative obligations, such as standards of safety, and impose
non-compensatory monetary penalties for violations. These
were the types of environmental obligations that were antici-
pated and accounted for by the Bankruptcy Code's drafters.
45. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 507 (providing the expenses and claims priority
scheme used in the Code).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C).
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 502. Section 502 provides that claims are deemed allowed
unless a party in interest objects, and allows response to the objection to the claim
after judicial determination of the amount at issue. Exceptions are enumerated in the
statute. Id.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(B).
49. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
50. Federal environmental regulatory statutes include the Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601-71 (1988), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387
(1988), the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-92 (1988), and the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1988).
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Affirmative environmental obligations clearly were regarded
as inescapable in bankruptcy. Environmental enforcement
against debtors was facilitated under the Code by the inclusion
of certain "governmental unit" exceptions to the automatic
stay.5 The express legislative intent of such provisions was
"to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection,
consumer protection, safety or similar police or regulatory
laws." 52 Furthermore, non-monetary obligations were not in-
cluded within the Code's definition of "claim""3 and thus were
made non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.
54
Penalties imposed by governmental units also were accorded
the privilege of being non-dischargeable in an individual's
bankruptcy case.55 During the case, however, it was felt that
creditors who sustained an actual pecuniary loss were in
greater need of a quick recovery than the government. Thus,
the Code stays government enforcement of money judg-
ments56 and subordinates penalty claims to the claims of gen-
eral unsecured creditors for distribution purposes.57
The drafters also included provisions for the non-penalty,
monetary claims of governmental units although, at that time,
environmental agencies did not impose liabilities of this type.
Thus, when the Code's drafters singled out only tax claims for
51. Governmental units are generally subject to the automatic stay. Exceptions
are provided for "an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such
governmental unit's police or regulatory power," 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), or for "the
enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment obtained in [such] an ac-
tion or proceeding." 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5).
52. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978) (emphasis added).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). A claim is:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgement,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, dis-
puted, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such a right to an equi-
table remedy is reduced tojudgement, fixed, contingent, matured, un-
matured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
Id. If, however, a non-monetary obligation can be reduced to a monetary obligation,
then it is a claim within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
54. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (discharge for individuals); 11 U.S.C. 1141(d) (dis-
charge for reorganizing corporations).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (discharge exceptions include fines or forfeiture paya-
ble to the government).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (filing of petition operates as a stay for the enforce-
ment of money judgment, but not for other judgments which enforce police or regu-
latory power).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (property of the bankruptcy estate is distributed to
penalty claims only after unsecured claims are paid).
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the governmental unit priority described above," they did not
pass judgment on environmental liabilities.
The drafters, when limiting the bounds of the governmental
unit priority, more likely were concerned about other existing
pre-petition governmental unit claims, such as those arising
from government lending activity. When the government
merely acts as a creditor, its claims are not deserving of prior-
ity. Unlike tax claims or cleanup claims, claims arising from
government lending are contractual and consensual in nature,
not obligations of statute. Failure to pay them is a breach, not
a crime.
B. CERCLA Liability
With hazardous waste release becoming an increasingly
threatening public health problem, the need arose for a strong
remedial supplement to the environmental regulatory regime.
In response, CERCLA was drafted in 1980 and the age of mon-
etary compensatory environmental obligations was upon us.59
CERCLA established the $1.6 billion Hazardous Substance
Response Trust Fund (Superfund) for the purpose of financing
cleanups.60 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is
authorized to draw from Superfund to perform cleanup at the
site of any release of hazardous waste.6' Alternatively, the EPA
may issue an administrative order directing a party to perform
cleanup at its own expense.62
When the EPA incurs response costs, a cause of action for
cost recovery arises under CERCLA section 107.63 In some in-
stances, state agencies or private parties may also perform
cleanup and may bring actions to recover costs. 64 Such cost-
58. See supra part III-B for discussion of the special case of governmental unit
claims in Bankruptcy Code priority scheme.
59. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
60. See supra note 5.
61. CERCLA § 106(b)-(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)-(b). After consultation with the
Attorney General, the Environmental Protection Agency may draw from the
Superfund to compensate or repair imminent and substantial endangerment to the
environment. Id.
62. CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
63. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Violators are liable for recovery
costs for violation of CERCLA provisions. Id.
64. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (stating that a re-
sponsible person will be liable for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by
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recovery actions must be commenced within three years. 65 In-
terpreters have found reason in CERCLA section 107 to make
recovery as quick and easy as possible.66
A cost recovery action may be brought against any or all po-
tentially responsible parties (PRPs). CERCLA section 107(a)
defines four classes of PRPs: present owners and operators of a
hazardous waste facility, past owners and operators who
owned or operated at the time of disposal of hazardous waste,
hazardous waste generators, and hazardous waste transport-
ers. 6 7 Although the statute is silent as to a standard of liability,
the courts have uniformly found strict liability to apply.68
CERCLA does, however, allow PRPs to assert an affirmative
defense to liability where the release of hazardous waste was
caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, or an act of a
third-party non-agent.69 Such defenses are very narrow in
scope and are rarely availing. 70 Ordinarily, the government's
case will involve no more than a showing that a party qualifies
as at least one of the four types of PRPs, irrespective of an
absence of that party's fault.
7 '
Furthermore, the courts have found that each PRP is jointly
and severally liable for all response costs incurred, unless the
injury is divisible.72 Thus, a single PRP-defendant has no right
to demand a fair apportionment of liability in the govern-
any other person consistent with the national contingency plan"); id. § 11 (a)(2), 42
U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2) (stating that Superfund monies may be used for the "[playment
of any claim for necessary response costs incurred by any other person as a result of
carrying out the national contingency plan").
65. CERCLA § 112(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d).
66. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
67. CERCLA § 107(a); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
68. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding that CERCLA imposes strict liability on the owner of a facility from which
there is a release or threatened release); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.
Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that standard of liability under CERCLA
left to common-law principles); United States v. Tyson, 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1897 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (citing Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044).
69. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (precluding liability for any combi-
nation of these acts).
70. Drabkin, supra note 7, at 10171.
71. See Drabkin, supra note 7 at 10171.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1059-61 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (imposing joint and several liability); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572
F. Supp. 802, 807 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (finding legislative history supports joint and
several liability under CERCLA). See generally SUSAN COOKE, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE § 14.01(6)(c) (Bender, Supp. 1990) (discussing liability under Superfund).
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ment's action. Instead, the PRP must wait until it is adjudged
liable and then attempt to seek contribution from other
PRPs.7 s
C. The Problem of Categorizing Cleanup Claims for Bankruptcy
Code Treatment
CERCLA has caused a new type of governmental liability to
emerge. Unlike a tax, cleanup claim liability is traceable to ac-
tual pecuniary expenditures made on the debtor's behalf. But
unlike a debt on a government loan, it is non-consensual and
more closely akin to an obligation of law which should not be
escapable in bankruptcy.
Furthermore, CERCLA allows for possible disproportionate
assessments of cleanup liability against parties only remotely
related to the hazard.74 With the EPA's average expenditure
per site exceeding $12 million,75 many such liabilities are des-
tined to become claims in bankruptcy cases. Such claims might
be asserted by state or federal governmental units seeking cost
recovery. Others will be asserted by jointly liable PRPs who
seek contribution. In bankruptcy, CERCLA claims share at-
tributes with many different types of claims which command
very different levels of priority under the Bankruptcy Code. As
such, the proper classification of CERCLA claims for purposes
of a bankruptcy distribution is not readily apparent.
Theoretically, CERCLA cleanup claims serve the same pur-
pose as the affirmative, non-monetary environmental obliga-
tions which were made inescapable in bankruptcy. 76 Both are
merely different enforcement mechanisms by which environ-
mental safety is achieved. The inviolability of CERCLA claims
could be roughly preserved under the Bankruptcy Code by
granting cleanup claims administrative expense priority or se-
cured status. However, CERCLA claims also share elements
with the general claims of most lenders, lienors, and trade
creditors in that they are monetary claims against the debtor
for actual pecuniary amounts owing. 77 As such, the Code does
not clearly accord cleanup claims any special treatment. More-
73. CERCLA § 113()(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) ("Any person may seek contri-
bution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable" under CERCLA.).
74. See supra notes 72-73.
75. Drabkin, supra note 7, at 10169.
76. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
77. Compare CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (providing liability for recovery
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over, because CERCLA claims usually arise for the benefit of
governmental agencies, there are grounds to suggest that they
be subordinated, like penalty claims, to allow a better recovery
for general creditors less capable of bearing loss.
As the next section shows, the Bankruptcy Code lends itself
to plausible arguments for the placement of CERCLA cleanup
claims almost anywhere along the priority ladder, depending
on the circumstances. One can only wonder how the Code's
drafters would have peremptorily avoided the confusion over
cleanup claim priority had they anticipated legislation like
CERCLA and the age of cleanup claims.
V. POTENTIAL LEVELS OF CLEANUP CLAIM PRIORITY UNDER
CURRENT BANKRUPTCY CODE PRINCIPLES
The problem is not that cleanup claims do not fit among the
Bankruptcy Code priorities but that, depending on the circum-
stances, they can plausibly fit almost anywhere. 78 Where the
Code recognizes "superpriorities" or "superliens," the case
can be made for certain environmental claimants to recover
ahead of secured creditors. 79 To the extent that cleanup ex-
penditures can be said to "preserve" the bankruptcy estate,
costs for violation of CERCLA provisions) with 11 U.S.C. § 507 (providing priority
scheme in bankruptcy).
78. Moreover, at certain stages of cleanup, costs expended may not even qualify
as "claims" in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. Allegheny Int'l,
Inc. (In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.), 126 B.R. 919, 925 (W.D. Pa. 1991) ("Mere knowl-
edge of the existence of hazardous waste coupled with knowledge of the identities of
potentially responsible parties ... does not suffice as a legal relationship adequate to
justify inclusion of the claim in the bankruptcy prior to the claim's development as a
cause of action.").
Under existing case law, bankruptcy claims have arisen in three ways: 1) with the
right to payment; 2) upon the establishment of the relationship between the debtor
and the creditor; and 3) based on the debtor's conduct. See Avellino & Bienes v. M.
Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that right
to payment gave rise to claim), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985); United States v.
Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 835 (D. Minn. 1990) (holding that right to
payment gave rise to claim); United States v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.),
112 B.R. 513, 520-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the establishment of the relation-
ship between the debtor and the creditor created claim), aff'd, 944 F.2d 997, 1004-05
(2d Cir. 1991); In reJohn Mansville Corp., 57 B.R. 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (hold-
ing that, because debtor's conduct gives rise to the claim, the court should focus on
the time when the acts giving rise to the alleged liability were actually performed).
See also infra note 109, which discusses the time at which a CERCLA cleanup claim
accrues.
79. See infra parts V-A and V-B-I.
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80claimants can argue for administrative expense priority.
Where no special priority provisions are found applicable, the
cleanup claim will be cast into the general unsecured pool.8 '
Finally, the cleanup claimant may receive no share of the bank-
ruptcy estate, if the debtor or trustee can successfully invoke
the Code's provisions for abandonment or contingent claim
estimation.8 2
A. Cleanup Claims as Top Priority ?-Environmental Superliens
Environmental claimants may be able to recover cleanup
costs ahead of all secured creditors through the use of the
"superlien" provisions of certain analogous state superfund
statutes.83 Such statutes create liens in favor of state environ-
mental agencies senior to all other liens, prior or future, on
any assets of the debtor.84
CERCLA, since the 1986 amendments, contains a provision
for the creation of a federal lien for all costs of removal or re-
medial action incurred by the United States. 5 However, this
lien is not a superlien; it is subject to the rights of all pre-ex-
isting liens properly perfected under applicable law.86 Thus,
in cases where the debtor has no unsecured assets, the govern-
ment's lien will be valueless and its claims will be rendered
unsecured. 7
The extent to which CERCLA's lien and the various state
80. See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
82. See infra part V-C.
83. See, e.g., Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and
Response Act, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 13 (1983) (establishing liens in favor of the
state against property of persons liable for cleanup debts under this act) New Hamp-
shire Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-
B:10b(III) (1983) (stating that liens created under this statute are given priority treat-
ment in bankruptcy); New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, NJ. REV.
STAT. § 58-10-23.11 f(f) (1980) (stating that cleanup costs "shall constitute a first
priority claim and lien paramount to all other claims and liens").
84. See supra note 83.
85. CERCLA § 107(l)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)(1). The provision states:
All costs and damages for which a person is liable to the United States...
shall constitute a lien in favor of the United States upon all real property
and rights to such property which
(A) belong to such person; and
(B) are subject to or affected by a removal or remedial action.
Id.
86. CERCLA § 107(l)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)(3).
87. See supra note 31 (defining unsecured claim).
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superliens will be honored in bankruptcy is just beginning to
be addressed by the courts.8 8 However, such claims will have
to overcome serious constitutional challenges. The more am-
bitious superlien statutes may violate any of the following con-
stitutional doctrines: federal preemption, impairment of
contract, or uncompensated taking of property. 89
B. Unsecured Cleanup Claims as Superpriorities, Administrative
Expenses, or General Unsecured Claims
1. Superpriority Claims
Even in the absence of a superlien, the Bankruptcy Code
may permit a cleanup claimant to recover ahead of certain se-
cured creditors in limited circumstances. Where the claimant's
cleanup efforts can be said to have added value to a secured
creditor's collateral, the claim may become a "superpriority"
claim under Bankruptcy Code § 506(c). 90 As such, the claim
can be satisfied out of proceeds from the sale of the secured
creditor's collateral to the extent of the benefit conferred upon
the secured creditor.
On two occasions thus far, the bankruptcy courts have de-
nied creditors' motions to assert § 506(c) superpriority for en-
vironmental cleanup claims, finding that no benefit was
conferred upon secured creditors. 9' Nevertheless, the two
opinions do not foreclose the possibility of future claimants'
success in this area under other factual circumstances. In In re
TP. Long Chemical, Inc., the court noted that the EPA has
proper standing to move for recovery of costs under § 506(c)
because the EPA "stands in the shoes of the trustee since it
performed a duty imposed upon the trustee to remove the haz-
ardous wastes." 9
2
88. The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the federal lien provi-
sion in CERCLA § 107(l) is unconstitutional on its face because it provides for the
deprivation of property interests without according debtors their due process right to
an immediate, post-seizure hearing. Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1517-
23 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc).
89. Drabkin, supra note 7, at 10180.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c).
91. In re Corona Plastics, Inc., 99 B.R. 231 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) (holding no ben-
efit shown where collateral was "wholly unrelated" to property subject to cleanup);
In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (holding that no
benefit from environmental cleanup exists under CERCLA, at least in terms of "posi-
tive" reuse).
92. T.P Long Chem., 45 B.R. at 287.
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2. Administrative Expenses or General Unsecured Claims?-
Inconsistent Rulemaking
Environmental claimants have had greater success arguing
that cleanup costs are "necessary costs and expenses of pre-
serving the estate" and, thus, administrative expenses. 93 Ac-
cordingly, these claimants have sometimes been able to fully
recover cleanup costs ahead of all other unsecured creditors.94
However, not all environmental claimants have been allowed
to so elevate their claims; some have been subjected to the rig-
ors of impairment in the general unsecured pool.95 The rules
for determining the disparate fates of these claimants have de-
veloped in a somewhat unclear and inconsistent manner.
Administrative expenses have been allowed most commonly
on the theory that the estate is "preserved" by expenditures
which keep it in compliance with the law.96 However, other
decisions indicate that linking the cleanup expenditures to es-
tate preservation is not an absolute necessity for administrative
expense awards. 97 Instead, these courts have invoked the rule
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A). "[T]here shall be allowed administrative ex-
penses . . . including ... the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the
estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the com-
mencement of the case." Id. Administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b)
have priority over other allowed claims. Id. § 507(a)(1).
94. Windolph Trust v. Leitch (In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, Inc.),
125 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991) ("Administration expense statute is very
important because, upon distribution, these claims have a first class priority over all
other secured claims.").
95. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., United States v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 112 B.R.
513, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (reasoning that monies spent to comply with environmental
laws would be "actual and necessary costs and expenses of preferring the estate" and
are thus entitled to an administrative priority), aff'd, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991); see
also Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit (In re Smith Douglass), 856 F.2d 12,
17 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that abandonment by trustee is permissible if act does not
conflict with state environmental code); In re Peerless Plating, 70 B.R. 943, 948-49
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that, per Midlantic, trustee cannot abandon prop-
erty if abandonment violates CERCLA or state law).
97. See Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d
118, 123 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that state's expenses for response costs for debtor's
estate are administrative expenses under CERCLA); Spunt v. Charlesbank Laundry,
Inc. (In re Charlesbank Laundry, Inc.), 755 F.2d 200, 201-03 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding
that civil compensatory fine for debtor's violation of an injunction qualified for first
priority treatment as an administrative expense); Juniper Devel. Group v. Kahn (In re
Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 73 B.R. 494, 504-05 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (holding that
costs incurred by purchaser of real property from debtor for cleanup entitled to pri-
ority treatment as administrative expenses), aff'd, 126 B.R. 656 (D. Mass. 1991).
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of Reading v. Brown, 98 a 1968 Supreme Court case, which held
that administrative expenses include damages arising from the
negligence of the bankruptcy trustee.9 9
Some opinions suggest a third theory, although it has not yet
been the explicit basis for an administrative expense award.
The theorists suggest that administrative expense treatment of
environmental cleanup awards is a necessary extension of the
Supreme Court's ruling in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection.'°° In Midlantic, the Court
refused to allow a trustee to abandon property subject to a
cleanup order despite the trustee's explicit permission from
the Bankruptcy Code to abandon any burdensome estate
asset. 101
The court found that a "well-recognized" exception to the
abandonment power existed where abandonment would defeat
laws "reasonably designed to protect the public health or
safety from identified hazards."' 1 2 Although Midlantic con-
cerned abandonment and affirmative, non-monetary environ-
mental cleanup obligations, a few courts have suggested that
the Midlantic holding forbids the escape from monetary
98. 391 U.S. 471 (1968) (holding that damages resulting from the negligence of
a receiver acting within the scope of his authority as receiver give rise to "actual and
necessary" costs of operation for the debtor's business and are entitled to priority
status).
99. Id. at 485.
100. 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988) (addressing abandonment of property of estate).
Abandonment is the release from the debtor's estate of property previously included
in that estate. Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 602-03 (1937). Prior to the enact-
ment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, abandonment in liquidation cases was a judi-
cial doctrine. Dissenting in Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl.
Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986), Justice Rehnquist stated:
[C]ourts had developed a rule permitting the trustee to abandon property
that was worthless or not expected to sell for a price sufficiently in excess of
encumbrances to offset the costs of administration. This judge-made rule
served the overriding purpose of bankruptcy liquidation: the expeditious re-
duction of the debtor's property to money, for equitable distribution to
creditors. Forcing the trustee to administer burdensome property would
contradict this purpose, slowing the administration of the estate and drain-
ing its assets.
Id. at 508 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 502-05. The Court stated:
Where the Bankruptcy Code has conferred special powers upon the trustee
and where there was not common-law limitation on that power, Congress has
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal and distribute the assets of the
estate must yield to governmental interest in public health and safety.
Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
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cleanup liabilities through Bankruptcy Code channels.' 0 3 This
theory would seem to countenance administrative expense pri-
ority for cleanup claims, regardless of whether it can be said
that the estate was actually preserved or the trustee was actu-
ally negligent.
On the other hand, courts that have ruled against priority
treatment have looked very closely at whether the cleanup ex-
penditures in question were truly costs of "preserving the es-
tate."'' 4 In these cases, administrative expense applications
have failed where the hazardous waste site in question was not
part of the bankruptcy estate, 10 5 and where the underlying
claim was found to have arisen before the estate was created by
the filing of the petition.'
0 6
The trouble is, however, that where administrative expenses
have been permitted, the property in question was not always
103. See United States v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997,
1009-10 (2d Cir. 1991) ("If property on which toxic substances pose a significant
hazard to public health cannot be abandoned, it must follow . . .that expenses to
remove the threat posed by such substances are necessary to preserve the estate.");
Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118, 121-23
(6th Cir. 1987) (holding that state's response costs recoverable as administrative ex-
penses in bankruptcy proceeding); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 783 (D. Me. 1987)
("Implicit in Midlantic is the recognition that in some circumstances the priorities of
the Bankruptcy Code must give way to laws designed to protect the public health and
safety."). See also In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 286 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1985) (holding that, prior to Midlantic, administrative expense treatment necessarily
follows when abandonment is denied).
104. See Drabkin, supra note 7, at 10177-78 (discussing judicially established pri-
orities for administrative expenses).
105. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v.Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 142-43 (3d Cir.
1985). In Southern Railway, the court rejected a cross-defendant's request to allow its
claims for cleanup costs to be afforded priority as an administrative cost of the bank-
ruptcy estate. Id. The court, citing Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985), reasoned
that the property was no longer part of the bankruptcy estate because the cross-de-
fendant acquired the leasehold interest in the property. Id.
106. E.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.),
853 F.2d 700, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that courts may not give claims for
cleanup costs which arose pre-petition administrative expense priority until Congress
enacts law providing for such priority); Walsh v. West Virginia (In re Security Gas &
Oil, Inc.), 70 B.R. 786, 795 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987) (explaining that duty to cleanup
hazardous waste arising pre-petition is a general unsecured claim and is not entitled
to priority under Bankruptcy Code); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that even if EPA had pre-petition claim against
debtor, estate could not avoid liability for costs incurred by EPA's performance of
post-petition cleanup at debtor's plant); In re Pierce Coal and Constr., Inc., 65 B.R.
521, 530 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986) (recognizing that Congress may be aware of the
problem caused by the omission of environmental damages from the list of pre-peti-
tion priorities but nonetheless, Congress has yet to address the problem).
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estate property 107 and, in some cases, the claim in question was
explicitly deemed to have arisen pre-petition. 08 Moreover,
the issue of when a cleanup claim actually arises has not been
conclusively resolved by the courts.' 0 9 Therefore, the rule of
law is ambiguous and makes it difficult for today's cleanup
claimant to predict the likelihood of his or her recovery as an
administrative expense claimant.
Further potential for inconsistent rulemaking exists in cases
where cleanup claims are asserted, not by the government
against the debtor, but rather by a private party who has been
adjudged liable to the government and who seeks contribution
from the debtor. To date, contribution claimants' administra-
107. E.g., Lancaster v. Tennessee, (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d
118, 123-24 (6th Cir. 1987) (granting administrative expense priority for cost of
cleanup of property leased by the debtor); In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278,
286-87 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (same).
108. E.g., United States v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 112 B.R. 513,
521 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("The Court concludes, therefore, that in the absence of
a pre-petition release or threatened release of hazardous waste, any subsequent lia-
bility for environmental cleanup or remedial action is not dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy."), aff'd, 944 F.2d 997, 944 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R.
943, 948 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that, if the trustee is unable to abandon
the contaminated property under Midlantic without complying with CERCLA, then
the trustee has an implicit duty to use the estate's unencumbered assets to cleanup
the site).
109. Compare LTV Steel 112 B.R. at 522 (holding CERCLA claim arises only upon
"release or threatened release of hazardous waste") and Jensen v. California Dep't of
Health Servs. (In reJensen), 127 B.R. 27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (applying theory that
CERCLA claim arises when debtors commit acts giving rise to a cause of action) with
United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 835 (D. Minn. 1990) (hold-
ing CERCLA claim arises when response costs are incurred by the United States) and
Sylvester Bros. Devel. Co. v. Burlington Northern R.R., 133 B.R. 648, 652-54 (D.
Minn. 1991) (following Union Scrap and holding that a cleanup claim had not been
discharged in bankruptcy because the full extent of the debtor's liability had not been
assessed at the time of discharge). See also Carter Day Industries, Inc. v. EPA (In re
Combustion Equip. Assocs., Inc.), 838 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1988) (suggesting in dicta
that a CERCLA claim might accrue in stages as the EPA incurs costs).
In Union Scrap Iron &Metal, the debtor argued that its potential CERCLA liability
was a contingent claim under the Bankruptcy Code and was therefore discharged
upon confirmation of its reorganization plan. The court relied on CERCLA to deter-
mine when the relationship between the debtor and the EPA became a "legal obliga-
tion reflecting a claim for bankruptcy purposes." Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 835.
The court further determined that four elements must be present to establish a
legal obligation under CERCLA: (1) a facility; (2) a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance at the facility; (3) a responsible party; and (4) response costs
incurred by the federal government. Id. The court held that the "mere release of a
hazardous substance prior to the confirmation of a bankruptcy reorganization plan
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tive expense applications have been both granted" ° and de-
nied."' The courts have not yet addressed the particular issue
of the claimant's status. There has been no mention of
whether a contribution claimant might command a different
legal standard than a party who seeks to recover cleanup costs
directly outlayed.
C. No Recovery at All?-Abandonment and Contingent Claim
Estimation
As general unsecured claims, cleanup expenditures are likely
to be only partially recovered from a debtor-PRP. However,
certain avenues exist in the Bankruptcy Code by which the
cleanup claimant might lose its entire share in the debtor's
distribution. t
2
One potential avenue of recovery is through the estate's
abandonment of the property from which the cleanup claim
arose." 3 Although in Midlantic the Supreme Court frowned on
the escape from environmental obligations through abandon-
ment, subsequent cases have interpreted Midlantic narrowly as
precluding abandonment only where an "imminent public
health risk" exists." 4 Upon a successful abandonment, title to
110. Juniper Devel. Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 108 B.R. 378,
384 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (holding trustee liable to plaintiff for response costs ex-
cluding attorney's fees as fees not deemed "necessary and consistent with National
Contingency Plan"), aff'd, 126 B.R. 650 (1991); In re Pierce Coal and Constr., Inc., 65
B.R. 521, 525, 531 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986) (affirming trial court's decision to
classify contribution as administrative expenses).
11. Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853
F.2d 700, 708 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding pre-petition damages not entitled to adminis-
trative expense priority as court has no authority to create such a priority); Southern
Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 142-43 (3d Cir. 1985) (denying cross-
defendant's claim for priority as an administrative expense).
112. These avenues include abandonment, see infra notes 115-118 and accompany-
ing text, and contingent claim estimation, see infra notes 119-120.
113. See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284 n. 12 (1985). In Kovacs, the Court,
discussing abandonment under the Bankruptcy Code, stated, "If the property was
worth more than the costs of bringing it into compliance with state law, the trustee
would undoubtedly sell it for its net value, and the buyer would clean up the property
.... But "[i]f the property were worth less that the cost of cleanup, the trustee
would likely abandon it to its prior owner, who would have to comply with the state
environmental law to the extent of his or its ability." Id.
114. Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856
F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that cleanup costs were properly considered an
administrative expense); In re Brio Ref., Inc., 86 B.R. 487, 489 (N.D. Tex. 1988)
(holding that bankruptcy court had authority to authorize abandonment under I 
U.S.C. § 554(a)); White v. Coon (In re Purco, Inc.), 76 B.R. 523, 531-33 (Bankr. W.D.
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the abandoned asset would revest in the debtor." t 5 Thus, it
has been suggested that, in certain cases where cleanup action
has not yet begun, abandonment may effectively render the
bankruptcy estate a non-polluting past owner of the site with
immunity to CERCLA liability." 6  Subsequently, the EPA
would have recourse solely against the post-discharge debtor,
absent the bankruptcy estate assets. Unfortunately, recovery
prospects are likely to be scant in such cases.
Also, in cases where PRPs file for bankruptcy before cleanup
has been commenced, the possibility arises for the loss of the
cleanup claim through the Bankruptcy Code's provision for
contingent claim estimation." 7 Under this provision, it is not
uncommon for rather speculative contingent claims to be
given a low or zero estimate. Furthermore, one court has al-
ready found a contingent cleanup claim to be a valid candidate
for estimation.' 18
The contingent contribution claims of co-PRPs are slated for
an even worse fate under Bankruptcy Code section
502(e)(1)(B)." 9 This section has been interpreted so as to dis-
allow contingent contribution claims in the environmental
cleanup context.
20
Pa. 1987) (reviewing cases interpreting trustees authority to abandon property under
11 U.S.C. § 554; holding that abandonment will be permitted where it will not en-
danger public health and safety); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 272
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (holding that abandonment is allowed where no imminent
danger or impending threat to public health and safety); In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63
B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986) (permitting abandonment because the cur-
rent situation would not worsen or present "immediate and menacing harm to public
health and safety").
115. LaRoche v. Tarpley (In re Tarpley), 4 B.R. 145, 146 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1980) (holding that, once abandoned, title to property revests in the debtor as of the
commencement date of the bankruptcy proceedings).
116. Drabkin, supra note 7, at 10170.
117. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1). This section provides: "There shall be estimated for
purposes of allowance under this section . . . (1) any contingent or unliquidated
claim, the fixing or liquidation of which, as the case may be, would unduly delay the
administration of the case .... Id.
118. See Juniper Devel. Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 108 B.R.
378, 379 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (holding trustee liable for certain response costs,
excluding attorneys' fees, pursuant to evidentiary hearing conducted to estimate such
costs), aff'd, 126 B.R. 650 (1991).
119. 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(l)(B) (providing for the disallowance of any claim for re-
imbursement or contribution which is contingent).
120. See Syntex Corp. v. Charter Co. (In re Charter Co.), 81 B.R. 644, 650 (M.D.
Fla. 1988) (holding that contingent claim was properly disallowed under 11 U.S.C.
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VI. THE NEED FOR A FIXED RULE FOR CLEANUP CLAIM
PRIORITY
There are two troubling aspects of the rule for cleanup claim
priority developing in the courts. One aspect is legal uncer-
tainty: the idea that a particular court's notions on certain un-
settled questions of law can be determinative of priority.'
2'
The other aspect is factual uncertainty: that the facts of a case
can be determinative of the claimants' recovery prospects. 22
While these same uncertainties apply to many other types of
claims, the stakes are invariably higher when the fate of a
cleanup claim is at issue. Impairment of a cleanup claim affects
not only the economic fate of the claimant; it also stands to
compromise the entire national cleanup effort by diminishing
the Superfund. Ultimately, the quality of our public health and
safety will sway with the whimsy of the rule of law for cleanup
claim recovery in bankruptcy. The stakes are especially high
for other creditors as well, since cleanup liabilities can become
gargantuan and lay claim on most or all of the bankruptcy
estate.
A. Legal Uncertainty
The legal uncertainty surrounding the rule plays havoc upon
the economic expectations of creditors. CERCLA itself, with
its power to impose liabilities on parties only remotely con-
nected to hazardous waste disposal, has added new and im-
measurable risks to most credit transactions. However,
confusion about the bankruptcy priority of cleanup claims
compounds this problem exponentially. If creditors had only
CERCLA risk to contend with, creditors could eliminate their
risk by choosing lending instruments which are of higher pri-
ority than cleanup claims. However, because the bankruptcy
priorities are uncertain and because there exists the remote
§ 502(e)(1)(B) and that this section does not conflict with contribution claims under
CERCLA).
121. Such unsettled questions include when a cleanup claim arises, see supra note
109, whether a cleanup lien will be honored in bankruptcy, see supra notes 83-89 and
accompanying text, and whether claims arising from property outside the bankruptcy
estate can be administrative expenses, see supra notes 105-107.
122. Such factual determinations may include when hazardous waste is released,
whether the contaminated property is part of the bankruptcy estate, and whether the
claim is asserted by a cleanup party or a contribution claimant.
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possibility that cleanup claims may prime even secured claims,
such safe harbors for creditors disappear.
Legal uncertainty also affects the EPA's outlook. The lack of
a guaranteed recovery places any expenditures from the
Superfund at risk. This creates pressure on the EPA to pursue
only the most solvent PRPs for recovery. Ultimately, such
pressures may effectively deprive the EPA of its cleanup-and-
recover enforcement mechanism altogether. The EPA may be
forced to order debtors to perform cleanup themselves, which,
in many cases, debtors will be unable to do. Accordingly, the
national cleanup program could be compromised and certain
CERCLA provisions could be drained of much of their vitality.
B. Factual Uncertainty
Even if the legal uncertainties are eventually resolved by the
courts, the factual uncertainty surrounding the rule would still
put creditors in a bind. Cleanup claim priority might still de-
pend upon whether the claim arose pre-petition or post-peti-
tion, whether the contaminated property is property of the
estate, or whether the claim is asserted by the cleanup party or
a contribution claimant. However, such factual determinants
are not things which can be predicted at the time credit agree-
ments are negotiated. Creditors have to assume the worst and
take extra precautions. Therefore, the conditional nature of
the treatment of cleanup claims places unnecessary constrict-
ing pressures on credit markets.
Conditional treatment also puts the EPA in an awkward posi-
tion. For example, if the EPA is to receive a better priority for
a post-petition claim than a pre-petition claim, it will behoove
the EPA to delay the accrual of its claim when a PRP seems to
be on the brink of bankruptcy. Concurrently, PRPs will try to
forestall filing for bankruptcy until they are sure that the EPA
will be a pre-petition creditor. The result is a senseless waiting
game in which important cleanup efforts are stalled.
C. The Need for a Legislative Solution
If the rule for cleanup claim priority could be fixed at a con-
sistent and predictable level, the benefits would be felt by en-
vironmental agents, debtors, and creditors. However, as
recent case law reveals, it is unlikely that a fixed rule will
1992]
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emerge any time soon. 2 ' The judiciary is not completely to
blame for this impasse. Rather, the problem is systemic. It has
arisen because the Bankruptcy Code's drafters did not antici-
pate that claims arising from government law enforcement
would one day come in the form of direct monetary debts.
The resulting confusion over cleanup claim treatment is
merely an outgrowth of this shortcoming in the Code.
VII. PROPOSED PRIORITY TREATMENT OF CLEANUP CLAIMS
The necessary reform can be best accomplished by amend-
ing the Bankruptcy Code to establish a fixed level of treatment
for environmental cleanup claims in bankruptcy distributions.
This will require drawing a line between the competing inter-
ests of environmental enforcement and creditors.
A. Where to Draw the Line?
The Bankruptcy Code priority for claims of governmental
units is a logical starting point for the analysis. 124 Recall that
123. See supra part V, which discusses the varied judicial approaches to cleanup
claim priority. See also Carter Day Industries, Inc. v. EPA (In re Combustion Equip.
Assocs., Inc.), 838 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that declaratory judgment
action brought by PRPs for determination of whether liability had been discharged in
bankruptcy was not ripe for review since EPA had not yet decided whether to order
cleanup); Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.),
856 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that debtor is allowed to abandon hazardous
waste site where debtor's estate lacked unencumbered assets to finance cleanup and
plant did not present imminent harm to public); United States v. Union Scrap Iron &
Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 835 (D. Minn. 1991) (holding that discharge prior to debtor's
Chapter 11 filing was not sufficient to allow federal CERCLA claim for possible re-
sponse costs); Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc. (In re Allegheny
Int'l, Inc.), 126 B.R. 919, 923 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that claim brought by
purchaser of debtor's property to recover sums expended for cleanup constituted
direct contingent claim not excluded under Bankruptcy Code provisions excluding
claims in which claimant and debtor are directly liable to third party); United States v.
LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 112 B.R. 513, 521 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(holding that, in absence of pre-petition release, any subsequent liability for cleanup
is not dischargeable in bankruptcy), aff'd, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991); Dery v. Becker
(In re Sterling Steel Treating, Inc.), 94 B.R. 924, 931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989) (hold-
ing that cost of hazardous waste cleanup was to be borne equally by bankruptcy es-
tate of seller and purchaser); In re Corona Plastics, Inc., 99 B.R. 231, 234-35 (Bankr.
D. N.J. 1989) (holding that secured creditor entitled to turnover of collateral without
first complying with cleanup act, and potential cost of compliance did not take prior-
ity over creditor's secured claim); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that trustee, who could not abandon debtor's plant with-
out violating CERCLA, had duty to expend estate's unencumbered assets for
cleanup).
124. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7).
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certain tax claims, whether secured or unsecured, are slated
for a recovery after non-tax unsecured priority claims but
ahead of general unsecured claims.' 25 This priority treatment
codifies the notion that the potential tax liability of a debtor is
a component of the risk assumed by creditors when they ex-
tend credit. The subordination of tax claims to other priority
claims is a reflection that the taxing authorities can absorb
losses better than the individual claimants deserving of
priority.
Cleanup claims are worthy of at least the same treatment as
tax claims. Like taxes, cleanup liability serves as compensation
to the government for services it provides. Also like taxes,
cleanup claims are legal obligations arising under statutory fiat
which should not be escapable in bankruptcy. Of course, be-
cause cleanup claims can be so large, the assumption of this
risk by creditors will cause repercussions in the credit markets
of a kind never occasioned by tax risks. But environmental lia-
bility has become a foreseeable economic reality today. If it is
to be imposed directly on business and industry, it must also
become a factor to be considered by creditors who deal with
business and industry.
In fact, because cleanup liability is imposed directly on busi-
ness and industry, cleanup claimants should recover ahead of
tax claimants. Cleanup liabilities supply funds to only one gov-
ernment program while taxes supply funds to most of the
others. Although a single debtor's escape from cleanup claim
liability will not bankrupt the Superfund, it detracts from envi-
ronmental enforcement dollar for dollar. A single debtor's es-
cape from tax liability usually creates a small loss which can be
spread among many government programs. Still, the
Superfund is far less vulnerable than the individual claimants
who assert unsecured priority claims.' 26 Their priority recov-
ery should be preserved.
B. Proposed Amendments
The above principles can be incorporated into the Bank-
ruptcy Code through the following set of amendments (pro-
posed language appears underlined):
125. See supra part III-B.
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)-(6) (1988).
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1. Proposed Amendment to Bankruptcy Code Section 507(a)
Establishing a Priority for Environmental Cleanup
Claims
§ 507. PRIORITIES.
(a) The following expenses and claims have pri-
ority in the following order:
(7) Seventh, allowed unsecured claims for re-
imbursement of actual pecuniary expendi-
tures for the cleanup of hazardous waste
which expenditures were -
WA) authorized under applicable law- and
(B) incurred after three years before the
date of the filing of the petition or in-
curred before such time if the ex-
penditures were the subject of a
pending recovery action on the date
of the filing of the petition.
(8) Eighili allowed unsecured claims of gov-
ernmental units ....
This amendment would set the priority for cleanup claims
after the priority claims of individuals but before the priority
claims of the taxing authorities.' 27 The provision not only cov-
ers the cleanup claims of governmental units, it also recognizes
that applicable law, such as CERCLA, may countenance private
party cleanup and cost recovery.
28
The provision does not explicitly answer the question of
whether priority extends to private claimants who did not per-
form cleanup but who seek contribution for joint and several
cleanup liability assessed against them.' 29 Therefore, to avoid
any confusion, the legislative comments should make clear that
contribution claimants are not covered by the new priority.
Though these contribution claimants might find themselves
subject to huge, disproportionate liabilities, their plight is cre-
ated by CERCLA, not by the Bankruptcy Code. Such harsh
treatment may one day cause CERCLA's liability apportion-
127. The priority for tax claims would be pushed back to section 507(a)(8). The
new priority for claims of the FDIC and RTC would be pushed back to § 507(a)(9).
128. See supra note 63.
129. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
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ment provisions to be reassessed. Bankruptcy Code amend-
ments, however, are not the proper forum for such redress.
The three-year pre-petition window in proposed subpart (B)
incorporates the three-year statute of limitations within which
cleanup claimants must bring actions for cost recovery under
CERCLA.13 0 Under the proposal, costs recovery actions pend-
ing at the commencement of the bankruptcy case are also af-
forded priority. Therefore, the EPA may undertake cleanup as
its first imperative at any hazardous waste sight without facing
the danger of losing its rights to recovery if the PRPs file for
bankruptcy. Such a window of priority also prescribes a limit
on the exposure of unsecured creditors. When assessing a
borrower's environmental risk at the time of a credit transac-
tion, creditors need only look into recently-discovered hazards
with which the borrower might have been involved.
2. Proposed Amendment to Bankruptcy Code Section 724(b) to
Preserve the Priority Recovery of Claims Described in
Section 507(a)(1)-(6) over Environmental Cleanup Claims
§ 724. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN LIENS.
(b) Property in which the estate has an interest
and that is subject to a lien that is not avoida-
ble under this title and that secures an al-
lowed claim for a tax or an allowed claim for
reimbursement of expenditures for the
cleanup of hazardous waste, or proceeds of
such property, shall be distributed
(2) second, in the case of a cleanup expendi-
ture lien. to any holder of a claim of a
kind specified in section 507(a)(1),
507(a)(2), 507(a)(3), 507(a)(4), 507(a)(5),
or 507(a)(6) of this title, or in the case of
a tax lien. to any holder of a claim of a
kind specified in section 507(a)(1),
507(a)(2)- 507(a)(3). 507(a)(4). 507(a)(5).
507(a)(6). or 507(a)(7) of this title- to the
extent of the amount of such allowed tax
or cleanup expenditure claim that is se-
130. CERCLA § 112(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d).
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cured by such tax or cleanup expenditure
lien; ....
This provision would broaden section 724(b) to prescribe
treatment for statutory liens securing claims for reimburse-
ment of cleanup costs similar to the treatment already in place
for tax liens. 1 3 ' Thereby, the Bankruptcy Code would not
wholly invalidate such secured environmental claims but would
cause them to yield in part to the higher-priority unsecured
claims specified in section 507(a)(l)-(6).
The proposed changes to subsection (b)(2) are necessary to
carry the favored status of cleanup claims over tax claims, es-
tablished in proposed section 507(a)(7), into the realm of se-
cured claims. Several further cosmetic amendments would
also be necessary throughout section 724(b). In places where
the terms "tax claim" or "tax lien" are employed, amendments
should be made to reflect the section's broadened application
to "cleanup reimbursement liens and claims" as well.
This provision might bring to the forefront the issues posed
by the ambitious "superlien" provisions of some state statutes
which purport to alter the Bankruptcy Code priorities. 3 2 The
proposed amendment does not attempt to resolve such issues
but rather leaves them to be resolved in the bankruptcy courts
during the claim allowance process.
3. Proposed Amendment to § 1 129(a)(9)(C) Regarding
Deferred Cash Payout for Environmental Cleanup
Claims in Reorganization Plans
§ 1129. CONFIRMATION OF PLAN.
(a) The court shall confirm a plan only if all of
the following requirements are met:
(9) Except to the extent that the holder of a
particular claim has agreed to a different
treatment of such claim, the plan pro-
vides that-
(C) With respect to a claim of a kind
specified in section 507(a)(7) Qr
507(a)(8) of this title, the holder of
131. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
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such claim will receive on account of
such claim deferred cash payments,
over a period not exceeding six
years after the date of assessment of
such claim, of a value, as of the ef-
fective date of the plan, equal to the
allowed amount of such claim.
This amendment provides that priority cleanup claims re-
ceive the same treatment as priority tax claims in a plan of re-
organization. This proposed amendment is a concession to
debtors which recognizes that cleanup claimants, as well as the
taxing authorities, usually are not in as great a need of an im-
mediate recovery as are other priority claimants. Therefore,
they can afford to be paid over a six year period rather than on
the effective date of the plan.
VIII. CLOSING NOTE
Opponents of a Bankruptcy Code priority for environmental
cleanup claims have one predominant concern: that such a
provision will cause a large and undesirable decline in the
credit available to industries connected with hazardous waste.
This concern is undoubtedly real. However, it is not a valid
reason to hold back a necessary Bankruptcy Code amendment.
Comity requires a Bankruptcy Code priority for environmental
cleanup claims. Through CERCLA, Congress has demanded
that the costs of environmental cleanup be borne by private
enterprise alone and that credit markets absorb the adverse
consequences. This federal policy evidences a special need for
full recovery that should be accommodated, not defeated, by
the Bankruptcy Code. No directly competing federal policy
behind the Bankruptcy Code militates against the specific envi-
ronmental objective. On the contrary, the Bankruptcy Code
shows signs of considerable deference to the special recovery
needs of governmental units. The time has arrived for this
policy of deference to be expanded to protect the new and
unique type of government claim created by CERCLA.
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